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ABSTRACT :
We argue that the justification of democracy is best based on its positive effects on the welfare
of its citizens. But the difficulty is that the citizens are a group, and hence we need some way to
characterize aggregate welfare, and this, in turn, requires some way of comparing individuals’
welfare. These problems are notoriously difficult, but we accept the recent proposals of those who
look at needs and need satisfaction as the keystone in the architecture of welfare aggregation and
justice. This allows us to use a scale of need satisfaction as the basis for evaluating democratic
systems in economically developed states. Such a scale shows great variability among the developed
democracies in the world. We discuss the theoretical arguments linking the performance of
democratic systems along this dimension with the stability and perseverance of democracy.
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DEMYSTIFYING SOCIAL WELFARE:
NEEDS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE EVALUATION OF DEMOCRACIES
Norman Frohlich and Joe Oppenheimer
How to evaluate and explain the differences in performance among the developed democracies
requires a metric, and a theoretical conception of what is to be understood as performance. But
political performance has many different aspects: economic performance, delivery of social welfare,
citizen satisfaction, durability, etc. The initial problem we face, then, is the selection of a basic
performance criteria that can be tied into a coherent and justifiable whole. Only after that does it
make sense to move on to the tasks of measurement, evaluation and explanation.
Our theoretical starting point grows out of our work in political economy, social choice, and
distributive justice. We start with the notion that the welfare of the members of a society has a
primary position in the evaluation of the performance of societies. The empirical motivation for the
project was a simple and (for us) uncomfortable observation: that although the established
developed liberal democracies do not vary enormously in their per capita incomes and long term
economic growth rates, they do vary considerably in the distributions of income and wealth across
their populations. As you, the reader, will come to realize, we will argue that these considerable
differences in how democracies treat their needy citizens is a basic marker of their delivery of
aggregate social welfare. In other words in this paper we will attempt to tie together social welfare
and social justice. We link the problem of social welfare to that of social justice by identifying the
central role support to the poor plays in any justified definition of social welfare. That means this
paper will touch on some of the normative and theoretical chestnuts in the literature of social justice
and social welfare.
Our tactic is to build on the notions of Rawls (1971), who argues that social justice can become
understood through a lens of impartial reasoning. This leads one to regard rights and distribution to
the poor as a foremost concern. Our own work from this perspective (Frohlich and Oppenheimer,
1990, 1992) has led us to focus on a sustainable minimum or floor and Gillian Brock has recently
(2005) discussed this in terms of needs: We follow her lead. By focusing on basic needs as a
foundational aspect of social welfare, we will argue (along with Braybrooke, 1987) that two of the
biggest conundrums of the social choice literature can be at least partially avoided. We will argue
that fulfilling these needs is an important consequential implication of the normative justification for
democracy (see Frajman, Frohlich, and Oppenheimer, 2003). We then show that this justifies our
use of needs satisfaction as a foundational evaluative criterion regarding the performance of liberal
democracies. Such a move allows us to use a scale of need satisfaction as the basis for evaluating
democratic systems in relatively equal economically developed democratic states. Preliminary
examination shows that this scale shows considerable variability across the developed democracies
in the world. This then gives a normative skeleton to the theoretical arguments linking the
performance of democratic systems to needs satisfaction.
JUSTIFYING DEMOCRACY
Recently, an edited volume entitled “Justice and Democracy,” (Dowding et al, 2004) explored
the relation between justice and democracy. In the main, the authors noted that democracies could
be more, or less, just and hence there was no necessary relationship between the two concepts. We
are not so sure about this blanket conclusion and think that perhaps it requires revisiting. From our
perspective, the real issue is not simply the positive theoretical and empirical relationships between
democratic procedures and institutions, on one hand, and the justice of the empirical outcomes on

the other. Rather we think it is important to examine the relationship between the normative
foundational presumptions of democracy and the implied justice to be expected from the outcomes
of the democratic process. We will examine this relationship and then argue that particular
normatively unjustifiable variations in welfare outcomes across democracies can be used to evaluate
democratic performance across systems.
Keith Dowding, (2004, pp 26-27), laid out a number of historical justifications for democracy: 1)
the protection afforded citizens’ interests, 2) the opportunity provided citizens to express their
preferences and have them impact the political decision processes, 3) the granting of rights and
freedoms to citizens, and 4) the provision to citizens the opportunity to “come to understand others’
interests and to reach accommodation in a less antagonistic and competitive manner”. Each of
these possible justifications has a procedural component and a culturally emphasized notion of some
“good” that democratic institutions may help achieve. Each justification can be seen to have a
substantial consequentialist component: 1) the interests protected, 2) the preferences satisfied, 3) the
rights and freedoms granted and 4) the interests congenially satisfied. Notably: they all relate to
aspects of citizens’ welfare. In contrasting these justificatory arguments with those for justice, he
notes (p. 28) that “(t)heories of justice tend to set out conditions of the distribution of rights,
welfare, resources, primary goods, capabilities or whatever (hereafter the distributandum).” But a
more generalized view of the normative underpinnings of democracy can help us understand what
these justifications all have in common. Democracy can be seen to have a normative epistemology
and ontology regarding what, for social purposes, counts as the ‘Good.’ And it is this foundation
that has implications both for what constitutes justice in democracy and for our justification of
democracy. To develop the argument, we establish that the justifications for democracy itself and
for justice within a democracy can be construed as resting, most comfortably, on a consequentialist
base.1
We turn, then to an examination of the epistemological and ontological underpinnings of
democracy to cast light on what the distributanda of justice and social welfare might be in
democracies. These underpinnings will focus, naturally, on individuals’ welfare. And while the term
“welfare” has not yet been defined here and constitutes, at this point, something like an undefined
primitive, after arguing for its centrality in democratic theory, we will offer arguments for a twotiered characterization of welfare. The first tier will be basic human needs. It will play a critical role
in our argument.
EPISTEMOLOGICAL & ONTOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
Democracy is premised on the notion that political decisions are made by the people living in
the state (or the relatively large subset of the adult population constituting its citizenry), or their
elected representatives, via some voting procedures. A community’s choice is deemed to represent
what is good for the community. That communal good is decided by (or in a republican, or indirect
democracy, it is seriously informed by) the decentralized choices of the individuals within the
community. For that to make sense, it must be the case that the democratic decisions are based on
matters that can be potentially knowable by the voter. This bespeaks an implicit epistemology regarding
the Good: no-one, in general, is in a better position than the individual voter to gain direct
knowledge of what is good (at least for herself) based on observation, discussion, consultation, and

1. Of course there are other possible non-consequentialist justifications for both democracy and justice, but we believe
that the stronger arguments are consequentialist and take that stance throughout this paper.
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inward reflection. (Hayak, 1960). This is not to say that the individual necessarily has full
knowledge of the what is good for herself. Rather, it assumes that it is better for individuals to
exercise their judgement regarding what is best for themselves because in general they can have
(better) knowledge about their own welfare than anyone else. One function of democratic
processes is to aggregate those judgements.
In legitimating those judgments, liberal democracy reinforces the normative assumption that the
welfare of individuals constitutes a major component of the Good. If the Good is knowable at all, it
is the individual’s right to seek it for herself or to delegate the authority to recognize it to someone
whom she reasonably believes has better tools to determine it (a doctor, a politician, etc.). The
welfare of each individual is thus given an implicit equal moral status with those of others.
The democratic creed deems the social Good to be a more or less equal function or reflection of
each of the citizen’s (voting) decisions and then the resultant decisions of their elected
representatives. As such, it is a function of each citizen’s estimation of what is good for her, or, if
she wishes, her estimation of what is good for society. The justificatory structure of democracy is
built upon this, in that individual welfare is assumed to be directly reflected in the voters’ considered
choices. That votes are cast on a one person per vote basis and counted in a decision process and
help to determine a society’s definition of the good implies a moral presumption regarding the equal
status of individual welfare. By legitimating the vote, the state empowers the individual.2 The vote
is the reflection, at least in part, of the individual’s expression of her own welfare as well as a
demarcation of its fit into the larger fabric of social welfare.
But this leaves out the crucial and difficult problem of aggregation. If it justifies the search for
the holy grail: social welfare in some approximation of the form of a social welfare function it leaves
out the precise form, and its achievability.
THE PROBLEM OF A SOCIAL WELFARE METRIC
The possibility and impossibility of a social welfare function has been the subject of a mountain
of scholarship and we needn’t review that here. But we shall bring in some threads of that
discussion to place our contribution in perspective. Traditionally, and in our argument, the welfare
of the collective, or the social welfare, is seen as determined by the welfare of the citizens of the
society. This clearly is fitting with the perspective we have given of the consequentialist justification
of democracy. More precisely we might say that social welfare (W ) is determined by, or perhaps a
function of the welfare of the individuals that make up the society or W = f(w1, ... , wn).
Constraints
Before continuing, it is important to note the constraints that must be placed on any W for it to
make sense as an indicator of the quality of democratic performance. The premises of democracy
are the equality of the individual’s weightings in the collective judgement of the actions of
government, and in the protections given from and by government to their rights. These act as
basic constraints (Nozick, 1974) to any conception of evaluating the performance of democratic

2. This is a bit of an overstatement. Obviously, the empowerment is limited by the structure of the agenda and the
resources made available beyond the vote, in order to persuade, cajole, etc. others. And if there is considerable
asymmetry in the holdings of resources for communication, it may well be that individuals are given neither sufficient
information to know their ‘real welfare’ interests nor sufficient resources to protect these interests.
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governments. Let us explore these constraints a bit further.
There are numerous justifications that can be made for basic liberties, and many of them focus
on the need of the individual to be free from governmental oppression. These liberties seem often
to be quite decently met by libertarian demands for minimalist governments but these over reaching
justifications for minimalist government tend to leave out other major reasons for civil liberties.
If government is to be justified by the welfare it affords to the individual, then one of the
important lessons of the logic of collective action literature is that people must have all the basic
civil liberties if the demand for most public goods is to be manifest and factored into public decision
making. This follows because a group won’t even know that there are common interests without
the possibility of free communication. Indeed, this has become very apparent in the low social cost
that the internet has afforded group communication with regard to shared interests of such groups
as gays and lesbians, women, and other previously oppressed individuals. For groups to
demonstrate the scale of their demands socially and politically, they must be capable of sharing the
costs of the political efforts to change the public policies underlying their public good demands
without undue costs being imposed upon them because of their identity, etc.
In other words, for groups of people to meet their needs over time they must have the freedom
to organize themselves politically. If nothing else, this gives a solid justification for liberal political
orders. Of course there is no ‘ought' derived without a normative presumption. In this case the
normative presumption is that it is a good thing for people to get their shared needs met: a weak
form of consequentialist political philosophy. If we subscribe to such values (and most do) then it
follows that people ought to have these freedoms. Without such freedoms, even the identity of the
shared interests will often likely remain unknown. And hence it need not be presumed that the
liberties are to be justified primarily by their ‘negative’ protections from governmental intrusion.3
And of course there are other notions of performance that must be considered as sideconstraints including stability and a state’s ability to muster a proportional defense of itself in the
face of threats encountered.
Considerations of a Metric
But it is counter-productive to focus only on these side constraints: one man, one vote; and
basic liberties for individuals and groups. Any such formulation leaves out the content of welfare
and hence does not tell us what we demand of such a metric. Clearly we will want to be able to
make some judgements of form and content when we judge one system to perform better than
another and assert that W1 > W2 . In other words we are interested in comparing the performance
of societies with one another. But when we ask what properties we might expect of this scale, we
might begin by noting that c o m p le te n e s s is certainly beyond us. In other words, we do not claim
that all political systems, or even all democratic political systems, can be compared with one another
using the same scale: The performance criteria for a developing democracy (e.g. India) might be
quite disparate from that of a developed one such as Norway. Extraordinary differences in
economic circumstances, security situations, ethnic rivalries, and so on, may lead one to require a

3. A nice way to conceive of the traditional view of any ‘bill of rights’ is that it is the guarantee of minimalist protected
encroachments that individual citizens know can not be removed even if they are among the ‘losers’ in the political
games. The emphasis we place goes beyond this to note that the guarantees are perhaps even more importantly also
extended to individuals as groups.
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fundamentally different weighting of the constraints to the other elements of social welfare or W.
This will leave our comparisons to be those of the developed democracies, all of whom, we shall
point out, share a number of major characteristics.
Abandoning completeness, however, can still leave one with substantial normative tools. Sen
(1970) argued that in considering how to judge and evaluate a metric for social welfare we might
think begin by analyzing the concept of best, or maximal, in terms of the properties that we want
from such a metric. He proposed two that he called " and $, and then analyzed those properties.
He argues that perhaps a common language notion of ‘best’ requires both these properties, and that
together they imply a full ordering.4 We have already abandoned completeness in the universal set
of concern. To understand what is left, let us consider the two properties.
Alpha is the notion that if something (say X) is best among a set of items, if we then restrict our
purview to a smaller subset of the items, and if X is in that subset, it must be best in that subset also.
Note that this works for all naturally ordered relations such as higher than (e.g. McKinley is the
highest mountain in North America thus it is the highest Mt. in Alaska). Such a property may seem
quite ‘basic’ to any notion of best, or even better.
Beta has a similar feel: say 2 options, X and Y are tied for best in a subset of available options,
and one is best in the universal set, then they ought to be tied for best in the universal set. Again,
this also works for all naturally ordered relations such as ‘higher than.’ For example, say X and Y
are tied as the hardest metal. Then if we consider a larger set - say woods and metals, if X is the
hardest substance, then Y is still tied with X.
Considering the properties in such an abstract fashion permits us to identify when they might be
suspect. It is precisely when the quality of ‘best’ is a function of the environment within which the
selection is made. X might be the best in the world because of the varied environments of the
world. But restricting the environments to those of a subset, even were it to include X, may allow Y
to excel in the subset where the items that detract from Y’s performance don’t show up. In such a
case, Y could be best in the subset. And X, though best in the wider mix of environs doesn’t show
up as well as Y in the restricted set, hence violating Alpha. Similarly, if X and Y are tied in a subset,
it could be that one of them thrives better in the more inclusive or varied environment: hence
violating Beta.
The question then is the relevance of these properties for comparing democratic system
performance across societies in terms of a metric such as W. It could be that the system that does
best in the subset is trumped at the universal set because the environmental conditions in the
universal set are different. As mentioned above, such extraordinary differences in economic
circumstances, security situations, ethnic rivalries, and so on could lead W to violate some of these
suggestions of Sen. This might be, precisely because W may be context dependent - appropriate
only for stable, developed democracies, for example. But without any such properties, the statement
that a system delivers more social welfare becomes uninteresting, for we are saying that the
calibration is too context dependent. It is in part for such reasons that we restrict our comparisons

4. A full ordering can be illustrated by a relationship such as ‘at least as hot as.’ It implies transitivity (if a is at least as
hot as b and b is at least as hot as c, then c is at least as hot as a); it implies reflexivity (a is at least as hot as itself); and it
implies completeness all objects can be compared with regard to this relation (a is at least as hot as b OR b is at least as
hot as a).
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to quite similar societies: the long standing advanced industrialized stable democracies. Now it still
might be the case that such social properties as ethnic diversity affect the ability of a democratic
system to deliver some attributes of W, but we don’t think so. Indeed, we will argue that the long
term economic, and socio-liberty context of these societies is quite similar, and that they have
moved toward ever-increasing similarity on the ethnic diversity scale.5 So, perhaps within the
domain of the study, we might not face quite the daunting task to our metric that we might were we
to insist on universalities and still claim that W will give us some ‘ordering’ of system performance.
PROBLEMS WITH CONSEQUENTIALISM FOR SOCIAL WELFARE
But, of course, it is one thing to argue that democracy can be justified in terms of its beneficial
impact on the individual citizen’s welfare, and it is quite another to face the problem of what
democracy implies for the collective or aggregate welfare : W . A claim that democracy is justified
by its impact on the collective welfare, or W , runs into a brick wall, which has defied both
theoretical bashing and scaling.
One element of the wall is the seemingly insuperable problem of the incommensurability of
different individuals’ welfare and hence the near impossibility of generating measures of welfare that
are comparable across groups or polities. Utilitarianism, the most ambitious attempt to provide such
a metric, requires full interpersonal comparability of welfare states. For an individual to accept
utilitarianism, that assumption must be swallowed. For a society to use it, there would have to be
consensus on the metric. Such consensus is clearly not attainable. If one can’t measure overall
welfare, then, it’s odd (or metaphysical) to attempt justifying democracy on the basis of welfare.
The second component of the wall is Arrow’s General Possibility Theorem.6 Arrow proves that
one can’t expect democracy to adequately reflect the decentralized citizens’ preferences and still
yield normatively acceptable procedural and outcome qualities. Put simply, one cannot count on
any reasonably acceptable7 democratic decision procedure to reliably produce results reflecting
citizens’ aggregate welfare in an acceptable way. Indeed, the same holds if we merely try to
mechanically aggregate individual welfare to generate a social welfare function. At least, that is the
5. Of course their historical paths to such diversity differ widely. Only the US had a history of wide spread slavery.
England and its commonwealth led to diversity from quite divergent histories than that occurring in Canada, Australia or
New Zealand.
6. The problems identified in the ‘social choice’ literature (Arrow, 1963; Sen, 1970, Plott, 1976) present problems for
this perspective. The unavoidability of cyclical majorities or, alternatively, the surrender of a desirable property of
democracy, make interpretation of political outcomes problematic. Presumptions of probabilistic decision making on the
part of representatives or voters permits a reintegration of standard arguments regarding social welfare and individual
choice (see Mueller, 1989; Coughlin, 1988). Sen (1966) pointed out that a general restriction of values held by the
citizenry would alleviate the problem. Other paths are opened by Miller (1983) who argues that one ought to
conceptualize the relation between social choice and social good not in terms of any one decision but rather by the
trajectories of the policy paths. Later, Arrow (1973, 1977) himself argued that a shared conception of some forms of
justice can circumvent the social choice problem. Moreover, this function is often presumed, incorrectly to be one
which is additively separable in most modern consequentialist theories. Such an assumption amounts to a notion of
‘utilitarian’ additivity of welfare. Frohlich and Oppenheimer (2003) build on this criticism. Such an assumption, ruling
out all synergies, and team interdependencies among members of society, is perniciously wrong (Oppenheimer, 2002).
7. Here Arrow’s contribution (1963) was to set out the conditions that could characterize “reasonably acceptable”
structures.
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result if we have no interpersonal comparability. Obviously, full comparability allows for results that is the contribution of the original utilitarian argument.
So the two are related. Scaling this wall without interpersonal comparisons of welfare is nigh
impossible. But we propose to tunnel below it. To tunnel one has to pay careful attention to the
floor. And in this case the floor refers to something like a social safety net protecting the basic
needs of those who are not well off in society. A relatively recent stream of experimental research,
and a growing set of philosophical arguments on the normative importance of fulfilling basic human
needs provide some perspective on this approach. Indeed, our approach will be to assert this
perspective will allow enough interpersonal comparability to get us a partial metric, and one which
will obviate the impossibility results. But first we examine a bit more regarding the interpersonal
problem of comparability.
INTERPERSONAL COMPARABILITY OF WELFARE
In virtually all modern theories of democracy, the extent to which any outcome is deemed good
rests at least in part on the relationship between that outcome on the one hand, and some notion of
social welfare as well as group choice procedures. To some extent, quite magically, it is assumed
that the voting rule can (usually) deliver the right results8 given the citizens’ preferences (R), and
presumed choices. But, it is at this point that the traditional economic approach to characterizing
the good, and the better, has foundered for lack of interpersonal comparisons. This is because to
understand the aggregate welfare from the set of individuals’ welfare,9 we need some sort of metric
for interpersonal aggregation.
To see this, let us start presuming no metric. Then the traditional economic approach gives us
no more than Pareto optimality.10 Such a conception yields a “large” Pareto set. Without other
considerations, one is powerless both to compare the social welfare of different possible states
within the Pareto set, and to make any judgements regarding distributive justice.11 More content
8. Sen (1977, 1979, 1993, and 1999: especially chapter 3) has recently made a telling argument against the simple
utilization of income or welfare as a metric. But capabilities, which is his elaborate improvement on welfarism, does not
fundamentally change our argument.
9. Traditionally we could specify this as W = f(w 1, . .. ., w n).
10. The eponymous notion of Pareto optimality was given to us by Vilfredo Pareto, a conservative Italian Economist of
the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries. Pareto optimality is a condition or a state that is desirable and is best first described
by its failure. When a situation is not optimal, or is suboptimal, at least some of the individuals could be made better off
without hurting anyone. On the other hand, when a situation is optimal, to make someone still better off requires that at
least one person in the group must be hurt. The set of outcomes that satisfy this notion of optimality is usually referred
to as the Pareto set. The notion ties into efficiency and also has a direct relationship to ‘unanimity’ voting outcomes. A
group that uses unanimity to make decisions would choose to move from a status quo only if all benefitted and none
were hurt, or perhaps even if some benefitted and none were hurt (if abstaining in voting didn’t count as a ‘nay’ vote).
Pareto optimality’s relation to efficiency can be understood quite easily. If one person’s scraps are sufficiently useful to
another so that the user would either pick them up or compensate for the clean up, then it is inefficient to leave the
scraps unused. Note that no interpersonal comparisons are needed to make judgements as to what constitutes the
Pareto set.
11. To see this, note that if there are 2 persons, one very rich, and one very poor, who simultaneously lay claim to a coin
on the street, Pareto can’t say which of the two should receive it. Were the rich person to get it, one could not
(continued...)
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must be given to either W or R if one wishes to develop a more powerful notion of what is better
within the Pareto set. The traditional behavioral model based on pure self-interest yields no clues as
to how to formulate such a metric because, by design, such models posit the absence of links among the
different welfare states of individuals. All solutions that go beyond Pareto optimality and try to link
aggregation of choices to any notion of welfare require interpersonal comparisons.
And then there is always a need to map the decentralized choices of citizens being aggregated in
a democracy to aggregate welfare. For a simple illustration, consider majority rule. To link even
majority rule to a sensible aggregate welfare notion, one would need to say both that 1) the
difference between a yea/nay vote amounted to the same cardinal welfare gain or loss for each voter
and 2) that the voters ought to be counted equally. In general, two sorts of analytic moves are taken
to minimize these problems.
The first has to do with the introduction of more sophisticated preference measures. So, for
example, majority rule asks for very little information from the voter: ‘What is one’s first choice?’
Rather than using simple majority rule as an institution to elicit preferences, one might employ a
Borda count. With a Borda ballot, the voter is asked to rank all the candidates. A higher rank is
worth more points. If there are, say, 4 candidates, the top rank is given 4 points, and each
subsequent ranked alternative is given one less: a 3rd place vote gives the candidate only 2. The
winner is determined by adding up the total points that are given to any candidate, and the one with
the most points wins. Of course, Borda can be said to do a better job than majority rule: after all,
the voters are giving much more information about how the outcomes affect them. But there is still
a need to map the votes being aggregated, points in this case, to aggregate welfare. And this merely
requires different assumptions regarding what interpersonal comparisons must be made to treat the
aggregate Borda vote count as a legitimate measure of social welfare: it doesn’t let us avoid the need
for direct comparison.
The second is to make assumptions constraining preferences or the cognitive or behavioral basis
for choice. For example, one can employ a ‘spatial model of the possible political outcomes.’ In
this case, each individual has a preference for proximity of the outcome to their ‘ideal’ outcome in
the space. As long as the space is one dimensional we get an equilibrium with some normatively
attractive properties. But how this is associated with W is left undefined unless one interprets the
distances among the voters as equivilant. This is usually difficult to do since the space is defined
with only an ordinal metric for the preferences over distance. Similarly, one can assume
probabilistic choice responses by voters. The literature here argues that we can generate Benthamite
social welfare functions from two party spatial competition in these circumstances. But such
conclusions require a notion that the individual’s probabilistic response is a basis for welfare
comparison between individuals. The interpersonal utility comparison is now implicit via an
assumption that equal responsiveness between voters reflects equal, comparable, utility stakes. Of
course, one also needs the assumption of each voter’s equal weight in the aggregate welfare calculus.
Such assumptions may be interesting for model builders, but they hardly take the place of more
robust notions of comparability. One is left with the notion that comparability of preferences is not
going to be a rich vein to mine. But, of course, this does not mean that we can make no
comparisons regarding individual welfare.
More recent conceptions of how aggregate improvements in welfare might be characterized,
11. (...continued)
‘redistribute it’ to the poor without the rich person suffering a loss and similarly, were the poor person to receive it.

(e.g. Rawls, 1971; Arrow, 1977; Roemer, 1998) are all developed on somewhat less demanding
interpersonal metrics, and have allowed the conception of justice to regain life in democratic theory.
Rawls, in particular, is responsible for arguing that social welfare needs to be understood as
reflecting only the welfare of the least fortunate. With satiability, or the idea that the least fortunate
only count as special when their welfare is below a ‘welfare floor’ (Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1990
and 1992) such a conception can still lead to a partial ordering of social welfare states.
NEEDS: A PROPOSAL
The perception of needs as a major normative element is social welfare has a long history but in
recent times its status grew from seeds planted by Rawls (1971). In brief, Rawls picked up and
insight of Harsanyi that one might be able to identify what is fair in income distribution by
conducting a kind of thought experiment in which impartial reasoning was induced. Impartial
reasoning was to be induced by imagined individuals deciding under very restricted information
conditions. Harsanyi asked what a group of rational self-interested individuals would choose under
conditions of impartiality. In particular, people were to choose from among many possible income
distributions without knowing which share of the income distribution they would get. Harsanyi
argued that they would choose the distribution that maximizes the expected value of the group’s
payoffs. He felt that the emergence of the principle of maximizing expected value under conditions
of impartiality lent that principle ethical standing.
Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, (1971) elaborated and developed a similar scenario of imperfect
information (he called a “veil of ignorance”) and also applied it to questions of distributive justice.
Rawls imagined a group of representative individuals charged with the task of choosing, ‘from
behind the veil of ignorance,’ a way of organizing income distribution (and other matters) in the (as
yet unknown) society which they were to inhabit. The trick built into the Rawls’ “veil of ignorance”
is that it stripped individuals of their interests. They were assumed not to know their own places in
society, their own particular skills, plans, advantages and disadvantages. No-one would know what
role they would play in the society to be formed. This ignorance would require that each associate
her or his lot impartially with that of every person in society. Making decisions impartially would
channel rational self-interested behavior in the direction of justice and fairness. Rawls, however,
came to a different conclusion than did Harsanyi. Using notions of minimax choice rules borrowed
from game theoretic arguments, Rawls argued that under conditions similar to those of Harsanyi,
individuals would select an entirely different principle of distributive justice. They would want to
maximize the welfare of the worst off individual in the society.12 (He called such a principle the
‘difference principle.’)
One of the major problems with this conclusion was the audacity of the potential insatiability of
the maxim: to maximize the welfare of the worst off. The concern with the worst off would seem
to be motivated by some notion not of place (worst13), but rather of substantive deprivation and
ensuing poverty and despair. Our experiments (Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1990 and 1992) reflect
that the concern induced by a veil of ignorance is not about place but about substantive issues of

12. Rawls introduces the notion of “primary goods” and discusses his principle in terms of increasing the primary goods
available to the worst off individual. We occasionally use the term “welfare” as a shorthand for his technical term.
13. One might think someone has to be worst off. We are reminded of Garrison Keillor’s trademark comment that ‘all
the children are above average.’
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poverty. These issues lead people to talk of establishing a welfare floor through social policy.
The use of imperfect information to induce impartial reasoning by both authors led them to
focus on the pattern of the resulting distribution, rather than on other aspects of the problem. But
other authors objected strenuously to their concentration on distributive patterns. Spearheaded by
Robert Nozick (1974) this literature underscored the role of property rights or ownership, just
compensation for work, and other entitlements, in questions of distributing property and income.
From Nozick’s perspective emphasis should be placed upon fair procedures for maintaining
entitlement to the rightful fruit of one’s labor. In theory, a clear tension exists between these two
approaches. Entitlement leads one to question the legitimacy of any requirement to redistribute well
gotten gains. By contrast, justice based on patterns usually requires some degree of redistribution as
a minimal requirement of fairness.
Noting this tension between entitlements and redistribution, theorists have voiced concern
about the potential instability of any patterned principle of distributive justice. Although a pattern
principle may appear fair when chosen without full knowledge of one’s own position in the system,
that same principle could begin to chafe in practice: when individuals begin to feel entitled to the
property they earn.
Rawls emphasized the welfare of the poorest individuals in his development of a metric, and
understanding of distributive justice. In doing so, he skirted the issue of ‘preferences’ altogether, by
classifying certain goods as having ‘special’ consideration (see footnote 12). In setting up his
analysis, he did not explicitly focus on ‘needs’ but perhaps it was implicit in his discussion. In any
case, many volumes, articles, and experiments, later, needs were picked up, explicitly this time, by
Braybrooke (1987).
Braybrooke (1987) initiated a recent stream of argument in philosophy which was added to by
arguments of Doyle and Gough (1991) and which has been recently elaborated upon and applied to
questions of international justice by Brock (2005). These arguments emphasize the advantages of
using basic needs as a metric for an important component of individual welfare. Braybrooke’s
approach is to argue (p. 36) that it is possible to identify the basic needs associated with physical
and social functioning. Doyle and Gough underline the need for physical health and autonomy ‘to
be able to participate in a cultural form of life: ‘. . . to have the physical intellectual and emotional
capacity to interact with fellow actors over sustained periods in ways which are valued and
reinforced in some way.’ (page 69). Brock argues that focusing on basic needs is a way of getting at
what may constitute global justice. And the common thread that runs through their arguments is
that basic needs, although not completely free of ambiguity, are sufficiently clear to generate
interpersonal consensus regarding their evaluation. With relatively little information, one can tell
when another person is starving, freezing to death, suffering from heat prostration, illiterate etc.
Experimental research on questions of distributive justice modeled on the “veil of ignorance”
has, in the main, supported this line of reasoning (Bond, 1991; Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1990,
1992; Jackson, et al, 1995; Konow, 1996; Lissowski et al, 1991; Oleson, 2001; Saijo et al, 1996). It
has revealed considerable uniformity in subjects’ ethical responses to needs. Those experiments
demonstrate a virtual consensus across societies regarding the importance of providing a floor of
income for those who are incapable of providing for themselves. The arguments subjects brought
forward in support of such a floor are that there will always be individuals incapable of providing,
on their own, for their basic needs, and that society has an obligation to care for the basic needs of
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their most vulnerable members. As in the arguments of Nozick and others, noted above, subjects
also argued that the safety net offered should not be so high as to impinge on the entitlements of
those who are very productive or to unduly reduce the incentives needed in the society to encourage
others to maintain a modicum of efficiency (see a bit more on this subject below on p. 16).
Needs and Interpersonal Comparability: And this leads one to wonder how the focus on needs
relates to the difficulties mentioned above. Start with comparability: Obviously, it doesn’t take a
huge moral stretch to compare one person’s starvation with another’s banquet. In other words, to
return to our analogy, easy accessibility to consensus on what constitutes a floor of basic needs may
be the basis for partially undermining the barrier to interpersonal comparability of welfare within the
restricted range of needy individuals.
Given the notion that at least the most basic needs are lexicographically prior to other concerns
regarding personal welfare considerations, then the difficulties of some aspects of interpersonal
comparability disappear.14 We can identify some sorts of comparisons that can be made, and others
that can’t. Take two individuals: if one has all her basic needs met, and the other doesn’t then we
can judge the first to be better off than the other. Otherwise we can’t make a judgement. But given
that basic needs are quite fundamental, and that democracy has a presumption of equality, we can
develop a rough estimation of social welfare in terms of the percentage of the population left
without the satisfaction of their basic needs. Of course, there are other aspects of measurement
that might be crucial. Take a family in poverty for example: the depth and duration of the family’s
poverty might be an important further dimension of analysis.
In any case, it is clear that as Braybrooke points out, at the theoretical level, Pareto optimality
isn’t what is left to utilitarianism without interpersonal utility comparison, unless we agree that
preferences rather than needs or happiness are to replace utility (page 175).
Needs, a social welfare metric and the Arrow Problem: Braybrooke also conjectures that a
concept of needs instead of preferences could get one around some of the paradoxes of social
choice theory (pp. 27, 184-6). But here, his conjecture is sure to lead to less headway than in the
previous discussion. Although needs alone can’t help us get around some of the difficulties of
voting cycles, they can point to ways of doing so.15 Further, they do help us generate a slightly more
interpretable mapping from the welfare of individuals to an aggregate conception of social welfare.
But immediately we see that the victory will be incomplete. Without further assumptions, we will
have little more leverage than that gained by Pareto optimality. After all, once we note that a society
has not met the basic needs of all its citizenry we will have difficulty assessing the degree of failure
without further (normative) assumptions. So, we may wish to add that the percentage of the
population left without basic needs being met can be used to develop a partial ordering of social
welfare, we will not get a full blown ordering without severe assumptions.

14. Note also that life support needs are lexicographically prior to needs supporting social functioning.
15. To do that, needs would have to be weighed heavily in our preference functions. We show how this might generate
a Condorcet winner in Frohlich and Oppenheimer (2005).
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But this needn’t mean that we should give
Table 1: Toward a Social Welfare Metric
up entirely. Consider the illustration in Table 1.
Here we list 5 societies that presumably differ
Societies
% of pop needy
social
only in the percentage of the population that
welfare
only
only in both
rank
are ‘needy.’ In the illustration, there are two
in D1
in
D1&2
dimensions of neediness: D1 and D2.
D2
Obviously, a society like A, which has are no
0
0
0
1
A
needy is ranked on top. In B and C, 10% of
the population is needy, along one dimension.
10
0
0
2/3
B
In B, they are all needy in one way, while in C
5
5
0
2/3
C
they are split over the two types of neediness.
Making no judgement regarding the weights of
0
0
10
4/5
D
one or another basic needs (v the comment re
10
10
0
4/5
E
prioritizing needs as in footnote 14), B and C
nd
rd
would be tied for 2 and 3 place in terms of
social welfare delivery. D, on the other hand,
has the same 10% needy, but now all of them needy along two dimensions. Of course, one will
need ancillary notions, such as, for example, that the ‘depth of need’ is equivalent in all cases for
each dimension, but given such assumptions, it is presumed that having two shortcomings (e.g.
housing and food) is worse than having only one for an individual. So D is ‘worse’ than B or C. But
how we would compare D and E is unclear without further assumptions. Although there are more
persons who are in need in E, they all have only one deprivation, while in D they have two.
The illustration gives us some insight as to what it would take to develop a more complete
metric. One would need to specify trade offs between the numbers of people who are needy and
the depth of their deprivation. And the metric for the depth of deprivation is also not going to be
unambiguous. There will be various statistical measures of this that may need consideration
including minima, and measures of dispersion.
DEMOCRACY AND NEEDS
The above discussion can be tied into the justification for democracy we offered above. For
democratic citizens to play their role they must, along with certain well known rights, have the
capacity to inform themselves and participate in the political process. Of course, it will be important
to establish that the developed democracies have the political capability of maintaining prosperity,
handling ethnic strife, etc. and proactively dealing with the basic needs of their citizenry. Assuming
this to be demonstrable, then those citizens who lack the basic needs to provide for physical and
social functioning, are essentially disenfranchised, and the expectable fruits of democracy is de facto
denied them. This has been recognized as far back as Aristotle, one of the initial - though limited champions of democracy. In his Politics he discusses the functions of the democratic state:
Let us then enumerate the functions of the state: … First there must be food… (Politics, Book VII,
Chapter 8) (Later, in discussing distribution he says): Let me discuss the distribution of the land… for
I do not think that property should be held in common, … , but only that there be friendly consent that
there should be a common use of it; and that no citizen be in want of subsistence. As to common meals,
there is general agreement that a well-ordered city should have them … They ought, however, be open to
all the citizens. And yet, it is not easy for the poor to contribute the requisite sum out of their private
means, and to provide also for their household. … The land must therefore be divided into two parts,
one public and the other private, … part of the public land being … used to defray the cost of the
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common meals ... (Loc. Cit. Chapter 9)

Thus, Aristotle recognized the requirement that democratic states provide sustenance for the
basic needs of its citizenry. In modern times, while acknowledging that differences across
individuals may require different levels of resources to meet citizens’ basic needs, Braybrooke (op.
cit.) argues that considerations of justice require that all basic needs be met to a minimum standard
for all individuals in societies. He notes that these basic needs include the necessities for physical
and social functioning. Within the realm of social functioning he argues that there are several basic
roles in which all citizens are expected to perform: “... parent, householder, worker and citizen.”
(Braybrooke, 1987 p. 48).16 He offers a normative principle: that a minimum standard be set for the
resources necessary to insure physical survival and to perform each of the roles. While declining to
assign priority to any particular requisite in any particular category of basic needs he enunciates a
principle of lexical provision within each category of need. By this he means that the appropriate
method for society to meet basic needs is to set a minimal level of provision for each need and
allocate resources so that after the minimum level for meeting needs in one category is achieved, no
more resources are to be allocated towards them, but additional resources are to go to meeting
needs in another category, until the minimal level agreed upon by society for all basic needs are
achieved for all citizens.
Following Braybrooke’s formulation, and given the justification for democracy noted above, we
would argue that the promise that democracy makes is that it will meet the basic needs of citizens
across the various roles they are expected to play in the democratic state. Sen’s observation that
famines do not occur in democracies (Sen, 1981, 1999 a & b) can be taken as evidence that
democracies take this charge seriously. But preliminary evidence shows considerable variance in the
delivery of a floor for minimal needs, even for such natural disasters as Sen was looking at. Take
three cases: an enormous ice storm in the winter of 1998 in Quebec that threatened hundreds of
thousands, if not millions in the province; the horrible heat wave in France in the summer of 2003,
and Hurricane Katrina in Fall 2005 in the United States. Although the events are not strictly
comparable, the death tolls are staggeringly different: 25 in Quebec, 14,802 in France, and more
than 1800 in Katrina. There is a difference in the quality of response to the needy in democratic
developed societies.
A PRELIMINARY INVENTORY OF NEEDS
We still need some detail in order to approach an empirical task of evaluation. What, for
example, constitute the specific needs that are under consideration? Although Braybrooke himself
proposes a list of needs (and so do others, including the UN) divided into two subsets: physical and
social functioning of the individual, the list is quite sparse and intuitive. On p. 39 he sets out: for
physical functioning a life supporting relation to the environment, food and water, excrete, exercise,
rest, sleep, preservation of the intact body. Similarly, he identifies, for social functioning:
companionship, education, social acceptance, sexual activity, freedom from harassment, and life
without constant fear, and recreation. Now not all of these are state responsibilities, although the
state might be said to be required to insure that others (e.g. violent gangs or mobsters) don’t deprive
individuals of these basic needs.

16. He also notes that, to the extent that individuals either opt out of one or more of these roles or are incapable of
performing in them for insuperable reasons, the level of provision for their basic needs can be adjusted.
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Gillian Brock (2006) is a bit more abstract in her approach when she says: “a need is basic if
satisfying it is a necessary condition for human agency.” Brock notes that by linking inclusion on
the list to agency one “can circumvent concerns about how an account of such needs could be
sufficiently ‘objective’ . . . [to] . . . enjoy widespread cross-cultural support. . . . For instance, by
definition, to be an agent one must be able to deliberate and choose. In order to deliberate and
choose one will need at least (1) a certain amount of physical and mental health, (2) sufficient
security to be able to act, (3) a sufficient level of understanding of what one is choosing between,
and (4) a certain amount of autonomy. Because of its important role in developing (1)-(4), I also add
a fifth basic need that underlines the importance of our social needs; namely, (5) decent social
relations with at least some others” (chapter 3).
So we can see, enumeration is possible, and given that each society is a bit different, there may
be slight variations in what are the actual instantiations of basic needs: so they would require quite
different details in Brisbane than in Banda Ache. But food, shelter, health, education, work or other
economic support when work is impossible, all come into play. Since there is far less variation in
the structure of these items among the developed democracies than between any of them and
members of the less developed and non-democratic countries, we will be able to make comparisons
regarding shortcomings quite easily.
But before entering the realm of empirical testing, it is important to enter a caveat alluded to
above. In the experiments on distributive justice cite above, subjects identified three normative
components. Although needs were a pre-eminent factor, they were also concerned with efficiency
and just deserts. While we acknowledge the necessity of paying homage to some economic
efficiency and just deserts which have normative standing in their own rights as well as being
instrumental in achieving efficiency, we side with Aristotle and those others who give priority to
basic needs. Accordingly we propose that a first level evaluative criterion of democracies should be
the extent to which they meet the basic needs of their citizens. This is in keeping with the
formulation by Braybrooke, that we fulfill needs lexicographically but with satiation.
However, this argument brings us back to the observation with which we started. The
differences in distributions of income and wealth within different developed democracies clearly
lead to differences in the way and extent to which democracies meet (or do not meet) the basic
needs of their citizens. Even in the most developed democracies, where societal wealth is clearly
ample to take care of the basic needs of all citizens to some reasonable minimum level (the social
safety net) there are numerous individuals who don’t get the minimal support they need. In some
fundamental sense, then, the justification for these democracies is undercut. If “life” is interpreted
as the requisites of fulfilling the roles of a “parent, householder, worker and citizen”, then clearly, in
virtually all developed democracies, variable numbers of citizens are denied “life”. Moreover, they
have liberty only to function in a limited fashion, and are handicapped in their pursuit of happiness.
It would seem reasonable to use the justificatory criterion of “satisfying basic needs” as a way of
evaluating democratic performance.
EVALUATING DEMOCRACIES
Obviously, we have not developed sufficient fabric in the discussion of needs to give us a full
template for the evaluation of democratic performance. For example, are we to evaluate societies
only by the proportion of the citizenry ‘in need’ or also by their duration in such conditions (see the
interesting study by Goodin et al, 1999 which attempts to investigate these different dimensions)?
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Are we to consider all individuals ‘in need’ equally deprived, or are the levels of need, and the
number of needs that are left unattended to be considered? Raising these concerns indicates that
there is more analytic work on the metric of needs to be done, but at this point, we turn to another
problem.
WHY AN EXOGENOUS METRIC TO EVALUATE DEMOCRACIES?
Imagine a democracy that don’t choose to satisfy the needs of their citizens. If the democracy is
stable, and people seem satisfied, who is to say that the result doesn’t reflect the values of the
citizenry? And what is to justify the imposition of a set of values that might be quite foreign to the
populace. Indeed, looking at needs, rather than more amorphous preferences as an indicator of
social welfare induces a major problem. Preferences are directly tied to choice. If preferences are
given priority in considering social welfare there is at least a presumption that the satisfaction of
political preferences is via responsive collective choice. Social welfare is then tied directly to the
satisfaction of individuals in their democracy by simple measures of responsiveness of the outcomes
to the shifts in preferences of the citizens.
Moving to need satisfaction seems to involve an imposition of an exogenous measuring rod of
evaluation: one quite at odds with the entire normative justification of democracy.17 In the tradition
of economics such an argument would be quite devastating. Economists presume that each
individual has a unique and stable preference structure. Such a view would mean that the citizenry’s
set of preferences are fixed, and although there can be instability in political outcomes for all the
reasons identified above, as well as induced by changes in the environment, outcomes reflect the
rules of the game and the set of preferences of the citizens.
The traditional view requires that individuals have unique, stable, well ordered preference
structures. So entrenched was this idea that only a few years ago most sophisticated political
scientists and many economists, presumed rationality to be a tautology: how could it be otherwise?
Of course, much earlier, Kenneth May had shown that the premise was not a tautology (May, 1954).
But at least since the mid seventies, the stability, uniqueness and interpretability of preferences has
been under attack by cognitive psychologists. Consistent maximizing might not be a part of human
nature after all (see the summaries of the findings in Rabin, 1998; Quattrone and Tversky, 1988;
Grether and Plott, 1979; Simon, 1986; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986; as well as Shafir and Tversky,
1994). Indeed, the experiments that resulted in Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981),
demonstrated that the stability of preferences, and hence individual choices, are sensitive to the
individual's interpretation of the decision context, and hence, dependent upon the way that the
decision problem is framed.
The clear conclusion of the experimental and theoretical work is that cues that are given in the
decision context determine the value structures that are evoked, and hence the choices that are made
(see Frohlich and Oppenheimer, forthcoming). To demonstrate how context, can evoke different
preference structures, we crafted a set of dictator experiments with a difference (Frohlich, et al.
2004). Rather than simply giving dictators money to allocate, dictators and their paired other subject

17. Indeed, in 1990 Schotter (see his Chapter 7) made quite a serious argument that any evaluation of democracy
required a fully endogenous metric of justice. Exogeneous theories, such as those of Rawls, and Braybrooke, were
criticized as not reflecting the inherent self determination behind the theory of democracy. But Schotter goes on to
show that exogeneity has problems of its own.
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produced income by doing work. Then the dictators allocated the total joint income anonymously.
Our conjectures were that the work context would 1) evoke “entitlement” values of a normative
nature and 2) lead to more sharing on the part of the dictators than in a normal dictator experiment,
and 3) cause the sharing to conform to some normative rules reflecting entitlement.
This being the case, the evaluation of democratic performance as responsiveness becomes more
difficult. Which preferences are being evoked by the democratic political institutions may determine
many aspects of the policy outcomes in said democracy. A system that encourages great fear and
animosity in its political process may be followed with great loyalty by its citizens, yet one might
wonder if its performance ought to be rated highly.
The question then arises as to what are the things that people seem to want from political
institutions more generally. Obviously the social stability so prized by Hobbes is high up on the list.
Any examination of the African and Asiatic tragedies on the front pages of the daily newspapers
give evidence to that. But assuming socio-economic stability it would appear that the developed
democracies can be expected to deliver a bit more. The question is what are the elements in this
universal valuation of the state?
Experiments to examine the nature of justice from a Rawlsian perspective (see above, p. 10)
have led us to observe a number of surprising uniformities. There were, of course, a number of
treatments, but in summary, subjects in groups of 5 were told that they would be doing some work,
and would be paid on the basis of their productivity. They didn’t know what sort of work, and
could not therefore, know their relative productivity to other group members. The subjects in
numerous replications around the world always were willing to work toward a social contract, even
if it took a substantial length of time to reach agreement. In other words, from behind an
experimental ‘veil of ignorance’ individuals everywhere want to have a social contract. Further, they
were able to reach one, unanimously. In virtually all cases, the form of the contract remains the
same: they want a welfare floor to take care of needs, room for incentives to reward effort so as to
insure just deserts, and to insure efficiency.
So there is a lot of agreement between people for a notion of justice – enough to support, at
least provisionally, that there is
a universal human valuation of
a particular form of justice. It is
this conjecture that we use as a
justificatory basis for asserting
the conception of social welfare
of lexically satiable basic needs
to be a good metric for
democratic performance among
relatively stable developed
democracies.
DIFFERENCES IN
PERFORMANCE
Of course, it could be that
the provision of a social safety
net is really an indicator of
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Figure 1: OECD relation between poverty rates and social welfare
spending on working aged population (excluding health care)
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economic performance, and not a function of policy. That, perhaps there are such moral hazards in
the structuring of social welfare policies that decisions in the political system really can make no
difference. In the United States, for example, it seems to often be argued that increasing support for
the poor would just decrease productivity, and give us the problems of Europe.
The literature on this is interesting. One measure of the political efficacy of social welfare policy
might be the poverty rate as a correlate of social welfare spending. But if the poverty were mainly
among the working poor, and the social welfare spending were mainly in the form of old age
payments, then there would be a mismatch of types. So the findings of the OECD, who were using
a measure for poverty as 50% of the median income, is interesting. They found that among the
OECD members, a very high level of correlation (r = .824) exists between spending on social
welfare (excluding health) programs for working aged people and ending poverty (see Figure 1).
Of course, one might wonder if the social welfare
spending decreases productivity, and here, other findings are
useful. Consider the work of Goodin, et al. (1999), who
looked at a long panel study (circa 1984-1994) having to do
with various aspects of the political economy of Germany,
Holland, and the United States. Specifically examining the
fate of the poor, and the performance of the economy they
discovered that the United States’ lack of social welfare
spending meant that similarly performing economies
produced very different results for the average citizen (see
Table 2).

Table 2: Growth in income - post
tax/transfer 1984-95
per cap income growth
Germany
17%
Holland
18%
USA
16%
median household income growth
Germany
14%
Holland
16%
USA
1%

Although these are not fully thought out measures for our purposes, they are suggestive, and
indicate that considerable differences in performance, using our conception of social welfare exist
between the developed democracies.
EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES WITH POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND SOCIAL CONSTRAINTS
(THIS SECTION IS A VERY PRELIMINARY DRAFT )
This section is basically left for another day but the argument will be sketched that it is mainly
the checks and balances against democracy that protect undesireable (in terms of the above
consideration of needs) status quo policies that prevent the democracy from delivering social welfare
to its citizenry.
By thwarting majority decisions via institutionally requiring super-majorities for many decisions
to change the status quo, our constitution has in fact generated a government with less
responsiveness, and one which takes less responsibility for social outcomes.
Preferences alone when tied to problems of distribution are not likely to generate equilibria in
majority rule contexts. And even when they do, some institutional factors may well alter the
outcomes. In the discussion that follows we necessarily break up the discussion into factors as if
they exist independently of each other, but this is preposterous. Rather, informal arrangements are
encouraged, generated, and otherwise affected by the formal structures of the political system. So
after discussing the elements singly we will attempt to try to round the discussion by considering the
interaction effects of the variables discussed. But to begin with, let us consider some contextual
variables that exhibit considerable variance across the developed democracies and sketch their likely
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effects. We begin with the most obvious: turnout, or who is empowered to vote.
TURNOUT AND SUFFRAGE
It is easy to develop a sense of the importance of turnout in our models. Everywhere, the
behavior of actually going to the polls to vote is a function of income. If the granting of voting
rights is related to having an address, for example, then the homeless (obviously mainly very poor
individuals) will not be able to vote. If convictions as criminals are a function of income (they are),
and if restrictions on voting are imposed for criminal behavior, then again, the poor will be less able
to vote.
Assume, as we have, that the interests in social welfare are also a function of income, and it is
clear that turnout differentials that are correlated with income could have a large affect on the
outcome of otherwise identical political processes. In the simplest case, imagine that a fraction of
the persons who don’t vote are near the left of the line in Figure ? that constitutes the ‘1
dimensional’ political space, while all the others do. This will shift the median voter to the right, and
hence, also shift the predicted outcome from the simplest majority rule institutions.
Turnout and its correlation with income varies greatly across the developed democracies. Xx
add detail xx. We certainly conjecture the outcomes regarding distributive matters across income
classes will reflect who votes and differences in who votes will be reflected in differences in whose
interests are satisfied.
FINANCING POLITICS
Our image of politicians in democracies is that of self-interested individuals who aspire to
reelection. This helps us understand their interest in responding to voters’ requests. But satisfying
voters’ demands isn’t the only factor needed to win elections. Voters are notoriously uninformed
about the actual state of public policy and the role of the particular politician in it.18 This leads to
the need for publicity and advertising, and hence: media access. We can think then, from the
politician’s point of view, that three must exist a production process for votes; and money, policies,
favors, are part of the factors of production.
Xx (flesh this out) There are enormous differences in the financial arrangements regarding the
costs of media access in elections among the democracies. In general, parties that are sufficiently
‘popular’ or ‘supported’ in the previous electoral cycle are ‘certified’ and must be given free or
subsidized air time. This formula has considerable latitude in application. How much air time, at
what cost, to whom, where, etc. all vary considerably. How much parties can spend on elections
beyond that which they are ‘given’ is also variable, as is where the money can come from.
Xx illustrations from nz money crisis xx. Of course, money, like votes, are given to support
policies and candidates one wants to win. When some corporate donors appear to give to ‘both’
sides, it is not just out of ‘altruistic’ interest in supporting the electoral system. Such behavior is
correlated with policy or regulatory interests and support, therefore, doesn’t come ‘free’ in terms of
policy outcomes.
Xx data xx. In some countries the government has a major presence in the media and news
markets. So, for example, we can think of few developed democracies that have a less well

18. Indeed, this is a sufficiently important topic that we treat it more fully below (see p. 21).
d e m a n d ju s tic e 4.w p d

Page 18

established national broadcasting system than the US. These media corporations are often required
to participate quite heavily in the information dispersion process during election times: in giving free
broadcast space for debates, etc.
In general then, we would expect that the existence of costly elections, financed at the private
trough, would indicate that corporate, wealthier, interests will be more heavily weighted in the
political processes. Similar to turnout constraints, finance constraints are likely to overweight the
wealthier voters and their interests.19
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND EQUILIBRIA USING MAJORITY RULE
In the earlier section on Social Welfare and Democracy we sketched the relation between
outcomes, equilibria, and institutional details (see page ?, above). The lesson is that one can not
understand the outcome of a democratic process as a simple ‘aggregation’ of the preferences or
choices of the individuals involved. Rather, the details of the aggregating, or decision making
institutions can be understood to play a heavy role in determining the results. When there is a lack
of equilibrium such institutions may generate one, and were there an equilibrium the details of the
institutions could both prevent that equilibrium from being reached, and could equilibrate otherwise
non-equilibria.
That being the case, we here discuss some of the detail institutional elements that help to
determine the outcome of democratic choice in matters that determine social welfare and that we
will consider as independent variables in our analysis of the data regarding social welfare.
What we discuss here is neither novel nor surprising, but together they make for a set of factors
that we expect can be shown empirically to account for much of the great differences in social
welfare delivered by the different democratic systems in the economically developed world.
FORMAL PROPERTIES OF THE INSTITUTIONS: VETO POINTS, PIVOTS AND EQUILIBRIA
Institutions don’t grow by themselves. They are generated by the utility that they have to the
actors. So we can think of the institutions in terms of how they help the politicians go about their
jobs and get reelected. Of course, they have a life that may vastly extend beyond their original
purpose, but it is useful to think of how the institutions empower the politicians.
If we consider the example of a
particular institution, such as a rule
to end debate in a legislature (e.g.
the rules that enable what are
called filibusters in the US Senate),
we may want to note how they
create veto points and pivotal
voters. Specifically, consider the
rule in the US Senate. The rule
Figure 2: The filibuster rule em powering 40% to prevent the end of
stipulates that 60% of the
debate on a bill.
members have to agree to end
debate. Hence, a disgruntled 40% can prevent any voting on a proposal on the floor of the Senate

19. Considerable analytic work has been done on this. Some of it is nicely summarized in Mueller, 2003.
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and hence, prevent the public’s status quo from being changed. Consider then how the institution
works. Assume, for simplicity, that the issue is one in which the median voter’s position is the
majority rule equilibrium. Then the 40th (and 60th) percentile voting members of the legislature are
able to prevent the debate from stopping: they can veto the consideration of the legislation to move
the status quo. Analytically, this means that there are two cases to consider, defined by the position
of the status quo relative to the position of the 40th percentile and 60th percentile voters along the
line (see figure 2).
The first case has the status quo between these two members’ ideal points (O* in the figure). In
this case, moving the status quo from a position already between the two ‘veto players.’ Note that
no movement is possible toward m (the median voter’s ideal point). For if someone proposed
legislation that moved from O* to the right, the left 40% of the members would constitute a
filibuster bloc and could be counted on blocking the move. Similarly if O* were to the right of m.
On the other hand, the status quo could be at Q, beyond the space defined by the distance
between the ideal points of the veto players. Then a proposal would have to be crafted such that
the left block would be smaller than 40% against the proposal. Assuming that fL cares equally
about the distance to his ideal point on either side, then to garner her support, the proposal would
have to be closer to fL than Q. Or she would only vote for a proposal that was closer than O* to
fL. In other words, fL and fR are ‘pivotal voters,’ or ‘play makers.’ People with interests about
legislation will pay special attention to such play makers, and we would expect that financial
benefactors would also.
An institutional structure that creates many veto players insures that legislation will be relatively
costly to enact, and that the outcome will not be particularly responsive to the median voter’s
interests and positions. A further point can be made: There is a parallel between electrical circuits
and political institutions. We can consider institutions that are in parallel and those that are in series.
(Dixit, 2003) If one can get something done in a number of ways, the paths are parallel. We would
expect that costs are contained by such arrangements. On the other hand, when the action requires
a particular route to enactment, then all the gate keepers (now in series) need to be dealt with. Of
course, all real world processes are a mix of these things. Presidents can enact policy by ‘decree’ but
it doesn’t have the same force, nor the same status or difficulty being changed as would a law.
PARTIES, DISCIPLINED VOTING
In most parliaments where the survival of the executive depends upon the glue of a legislative
majority coalition, political parties are able to demand strict loyalty for voting on the issues that
come before parliament. And voting regarding governmental matters will be determined in the
‘cabinet’ of the prime minister. In keeping with the emphasis above on veto points and pivotal
players, it then becomes clear that the existence of disciplined parliamentary parties would restrict
the potential for a proliferation of independent ‘play makers.’ These more specialized fiefdoms
would not show up as a separate ‘check’ or ‘balance’ that could thwart the will of the majority. Of
course, the fact that disciplined parties come from, or are strongly reenforced by, the parliamentary
system of government will make it far more easy to test the relationship between social welfare and
political structures.
OTHER ASPECTS OF THE ENVIRONMENT
The above discussion focused on what we quite narrowly mean by ‘political’ processes and
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political institutions. But there are at least 4 other, less immediately political, aspects of democratic
societies that we believe impact strongly on the translation of political processes on social welfare.
We touch on each of those here.
A SENSE OF JUSTICE
Elsewhere (Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 2005) we have shown that even a partially shared sense
of distributional justice can equilibrate a political trajectory so that the long term ‘end state’
regarding the distribution of welfare will conform to the shared conception of justice, and not lead
to the expected voting or social choice cycles over distributional matters, as discussed above (see
page ?). The variable that determines the likelihood of cycles over distributional matters is the
priority the political system induces in the citizens’ valuation of ‘fairness’ and ‘justice’ which we
would argue stems from the capacity of the political process and ‘leaders’ to ‘frame’ issues more
generally (see Frohlich, et. al., 2005).
Again, the more ‘disciplined’ the parties, the fewer the independent ‘play makers’ the easier it
will be to frame political issues coherently. The existence of many independent political veto points
will mean that there will be a sharing of political power: checks and balances will disburse the
message makers and hence the framing of political issues will be more a function of other interests
rather than deliberate political strategy of teams of vote-getters.
MOBILITY OF CAPITAL
The ability to tax progressively is limited by the ability of individuals to move their income and
wealth to jurisdictions to avoid taxation (Boix, 2003). In so far as the larger social insurance
programs must be financed by taxes, and, if the benefits are to go to the poorest, part of the support
of these programs must come from redistributional aspects of the taxes the redistributional
possibilities are limited by the mobility of capital and income.
INFORMATION
Given our understanding of public goods as being given to a group of individuals, the outcomes
of most political (as opposed to personal) decisions are quite obviously public goods. We can draw
implications from collective action analysis regarding how people will inform themselves regarding
political decisions, such as voting. Information, and information processing is costly. Consider
Heather, a newspaper reader. She notices the variety of things to read, and chooses, within the
constraints that she has perhaps ½ hour at breakfast. Twenty or more minutes were spent on page 1
and now she skims; the headlines suggest to her many items of interest. On page 4, something that
looks negative and important concerning a candidate she was going to vote for in the next election,
and there also, an item on pollution at the beach Iris was planning to go to for vacation. Of course
she is torn, wants to read both, but must run. How to decide?
Let’s consider why Iris is so likely to read about the beach and not the candidate. Getting
information about the candidate can lead her to avoid the error of voting for the wrong candidate:
someone she would rather not see win. Getting information about the beach can lead her to avoid
the error of going to the wrong beach, someplace she would rather not swim. If it is an important
office, probably the election could have a bigger impact (higher taxes, loss of programs that matter
to her, perhaps a war, etc.) than a somewhat less nice vacation, but . . . Gathering all the information
in the world about the candidate isn’t likely to do more than prevent her from making a mistake in
her voting. It is very unlikely to change the outcome of the election.
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Similar to the logic of collective action, the rational voter decides not to invest in the
information about the public good: not so clearly because of self-interest, but because of lack of
efficacy (Downs, 1957).20 The argument leads to a law-like statement:
In general, individuals have a radically discounted interest in acquiring information
about political affairs. Citizens will, in general remain rationally ignorant. (Downs, 1957).
This has implications for the performance of democracies:
to remain informed there has to be a ‘cheap’ stream of information for the voters. So for example
in the fall of 2005, all the citizens of New Orleans, and the gulf coast region of the United States,
directly observed the effects of Hurricane Katrina. Many of them also directly experienced or were
neighbors of those who experienced the failures of the response of the government in giving aid. In
Louisiana, no could not avoid knowing that the levees gave way, that rescue efforts were dismal, that
the poor blacks were virtually left to die, that FEMA failed in delivering help. Voters who felt that
they too may have been abandoned need not have more information than that to know they want
the government to be changed.21 But not all information need be gathered in such a casual manner.
Wealth brings one private interests to acquire political news, hence the wealthy will be far more
politically informed than the poor. Therefore, without mass organizations such as unions, class
based parties, the poor generally will not correctly identify their political interests, but the wealthy
may.
PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
There is, perhaps, an interesting relationship to be seen between private property rights and the
British common law tradition. For in common law societies (e.g. all of the ex-members of the
British empire) what becomes law is a function of how particular legal precedents can be used to
shed light on current cases. This means that the legal code is changed not one decision at a time,
but on an accrual basis by courtroom decisions. In such a system, the decisions regarding one
private property rights, perhaps originally argued for only one form of property, can gradually be
extended to other forms of property. Similarly behaviors can be protected far beyond what was
originally conceived as being covered.
So, for example, the free-speech protections in the US Bill of Rights was extended to cover
corporate speech (i.e. advertising, etc.) in a manner totally unlikely to have been consistent with the
framers’ conception of the meaning of freedom of speech. The same path led to a strong protection
for an equal role for corporate money in electoral politics, even though by doing this, the free

20. Reviewing one experimental design is revealing, running it in a class is eye opening. John Pisciotta, an economist at
Baylor University designed a simple in - class experiment about rational ignorance that is also a learning exercise for the
participants. They are given a budget to spend on gathering information about a private purchase and a voting in a
referendum decision. The values are similar for the outcomes in the two classes, and the students can choose what
information to invest in. Round one leads to a split investment pattern. But quickly the pattern of investment in
information shifts to the private decision as the students become aware that there is less to be gained in gathering
information on what to vote for than what to buy.
21. Indeed, I should note the empirical finding of Amartya Sen (1981) that famines never have happened in a
democracy. His theoretical discussion of this (in chapter 7, “Famines and Other Crises” 1999) is in the spirit of this
essay.
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speech was being given neither to ‘voters’ nor to ‘associations of voters.’ Rather, the right to buy
commercial political messages was being given to corporations.
And although the rights that slave-holders had to their slave property were terminated by the
Civil War and the constitutional changes thereafter, such a conclusionary tale may miss the point.
Because slavery was contentious, and many cases were brought to court, many nuances regarding
property rights were developed in the United States. The many protections built up by common
law decisions securing the rights of property owners to slaves had been extended to other forms of
property and served to extend the conception of private property rights in the United States.
PULLING TOGETHER INSTITUTIONS AND ENVIRONMENT AND OUTCOMES
How do the factors we have discussed come together to affect the outcomes regarding social
welfare?
CONCENTRATED INTERESTS AND DISPERSED CONSTITUENTS
RESPONSIVENESS AND RESPONSIBILITY
TRUST IN GOVERNMENT
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